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THE FIT DIMENSION
Abner S. Greene*
As a matter of constitutional methodology, Jim Fleming's and Cass
Sunstein's books, Securing Constitutional Democracy' and Radicals in
Robes,2 are quite different. Fleming develops an elaborate constitutional
architecture, which he calls constitutional constructivism, pressing courts to
secure the preconditions for deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy, so that citizens may exercise their two moral powers, a capacity
for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. Sunstein
advances a more cautious agenda, which he calls minimalism, favoring
shallow and narrow judicial rulings, asking courts to avoid taking stands on
big, contested constitutional questions and to decide only what needs to be
decided in the case at hand. Yet, despite their obvious differences in
methodology, Fleming's and Sunstein's theories share two important
features. Both theories advance a view of constitutional perfectionism that
insists that justification be constrained by fit. And both theories rely on a
view of fit that pays attention not to original meaning or understanding, but
rather to precedent: to how constitutional law develops in a common-lawlike fashion. In this essay, I will focus on these shared qualities, and will
argue that it is difficult-and undesirable-for constitutional theory to
avoid a broader perfectionism, where fit, even of the precedential sort, must
always take a back seat to justification.
I. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT PERFECTIONISM
Three different types of constitutional perfectionism make an appearance
in Fleming's book. The first, aspirationalist perfectionism, pays virtually
no attention to fit and focuses almost entirely on justification. For example,
Fleming opens his acknowledgments with this: "In this book, I put forward
a Constitution-perfecting theory, one that aspires to interpret the American
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be." 3 His last chapter returns to
this kind of formulation. He says, "[W]e should embrace a Constitutionperfecting theory of interpretation, which proudly aims at happy endings

* Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy:

The Case of Autonomy

(2006).
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong
for America (2005).
3. Fleming, supra note 1, at ix.
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rather than reveling in the imperfections that the Constitution might be
interpreted to embody." 4 And the peroration is unabashedly aspirationalist.
On the last page, Fleming says that his theory
does not conceive the commitment to fidelity to the Constitution as
commanding us to follow the authority of the past. It exhorts us to
conceive fidelity in terms of honoring our aspirational principles rather
than merely following our historical practices and concrete original
5
understanding, which no doubt have fallen short of those principles.
A second type of perfectionism, which we might call coherentism,
appears once in the book, but early, as an important footnote. In his
opening substantive chapter, Fleming says that "no one has developed an
alternative substantive Constitution-perfecting theory" 6 and drops the
following footnote: "I mean 'perfecting' in the sense of interpreting the
Constitution with integrity so as to render it a coherent whole, not in Henry
Monaghan's caricatured sense of 'Our Perfect Constitution' as a perfect
7
liberal utopia or an 'ideal object' of political morality."
Fleming seems most committed, though, to splitting the difference
between aspirationalism and coherentism, between reading the Constitution
as reaching happy endings and reading it to be internally coherent. This
third type of perfectionism we might call Dworkinian, for it is Ronald
Dworkin who has most famously argued that constitutional interpretation
involves fit plus justification. 8 We must search for the constitutional
interpretation "that best fits and justifies the constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order,"9 maintains Fleming. He says his theory is
one "of constructing our Constitution, not one that is perfectly just
(unmoored by the constraints of our constitutional text, history, and
structure, or by those of our practice, tradition, and culture)."' 10 And in a
formulation he often repeats, Fleming maintains that "constitutional
constructivism recognizes that while our principles may fit and justify most
of our practices, they enable us to criticize some of those practices for
failing to live up to our constitutional commitments."' I Again echoing
Dworkin, Fleming contends that a constitutional constructivist has "a

4. Id. at 211; see also id. at 225 (advancing a "happy endings"/anti-constitutional evil
position).
5. Id. at 226-27.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at230n.15.
8. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 7-12 (1996).
9. Fleming, supra note 1, at 70; see also id. at 84.
10. Id. at 6; see also id. at 61; id. at 83 ("Nor does it make a far-fetched Panglossian
claim that our Constitution establishes a perfect liberal utopia.").
11. Id. at 6; see also id. at 98, 118, 232 n.26.
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responsibility to construct" 12 the skeleton of a Constitution from, inter alia,
fixed points of U.S. Supreme Court case law. 13
Sunstein critiques both fundamentalists (who claim to rely on the original
meaning of constitutional text) and perfectionists (who grant courts power
to read the Constitution in the "best possible light"). 14 But in his essay for
this Symposium, Sunstein admits that, in an important sense, all theories of
constitutional interpretation are perfectionist, if (a) by perfectionist we
mean fits plus justifies, and (b) we can include concerns about allocation of
institutional responsibilities (between courts and the political branches of
government) in determining how to read the Constitution to be the best it
15
can be.

II.

PERFECTIONISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

So both Fleming and Sunstein agree that constitutional interpretation
involves accounting for fit points-such as text and precedent16-and
developing an understanding of constitutional principle in light of such fit
points. They differ, though, about institutional capacity, with Fleming
much more likely to deem courts the appropriate governmental organ to
develop and apply constitutional meaning. For Fleming, courts are needed
to secure the preconditions for deliberative democracy (for example,
speech, press, and voting rights) and for deliberative autonomy (for
example, intimate association and dominion over one's body). He writes,
"Courts should exercise stringent review to strike down political decisions
that do not respect the two types of basic liberties because both are
preconditions for the trustworthiness of such decisions." 17 He distinguishes
the judicially enforceable Constitution from the Constitution itself, 18
"call[ing] for judicial enforcement of constitutional norms in situations
where the political processes are systematically untrustworthy, but
for... enforcement of constitutional norms outside the courts in situations
where the political processes are systematically trustworthy."' 19 The latter
include "enforcement of commitments to federalism, states' rights, and
separation of powers as well as commitments to property rights and
economic liberties." 2 0

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 93.
See infra text accompanying notes 44-55.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 32.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2869-70

(2007).

16. Neither is keen on original meaning or understanding, and I will not otherwise
discuss that point here.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Fleming, supra note 1, at 71.
See id. at 35, 71, 74, 135, 169, 214-15.
Id. at 74.
Id.
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Sunstein's minimalism provides a smaller role for the judiciary, and a
larger one for the elected branches and the people. He has various
arguments for this result: (a) The virtue of leaving things to elected
officials. Here Sunstein joins scholars such as Jeremy Waldron (although
Waldron goes further 21) in advancing a conception of democracy that
would defer substantially to legislative majorities. 22 (b) Judicial fallibility.
Many constitutional cases involve tough, contested questions with vague
constitutional text, and judges may get answers wrong. 23 (c) Judicial
creativity. Sunstein critiques aspirationalist perfectionism of the judicial
review variety for giving judges too much power to pick and choose among
readings of the Constitution, without a sufficient anchor.24 (d) Unintended
bad consequences of judicial review. Sometimes resolving contested issues
judicially will lead to worse results, for a variety of backlash-type reasons,
25
than if the courts had left things to the political process.
In my judgment, Fleming fails to defend adequately his dividing line
between what is judicially enforceable and what is not, while Sunstein fails
to defend adequately the deference he would give to legislative majorities.
In an impressive critical part of his book, Fleming goes after theorists such
as John Hart Ely for promoting a theory of judicial review linked only to
ensuring the smooth flowing of political processes and to correcting process
failures. 26 It is more than a bit odd, then, to see Fleming pronounce a
distinction between the judicially enforceable Constitution and the
Constitution itself, based ... on a theory of political process failure! More
importantly, it is doubtful whether Fleming's line between systematically
trustworthy and untrustworthy political processes can withstand scrutiny.
Although he does not explain why, I assume he relegates protection of
federalism, separation of powers, and economic rights to political processes
because these are matters for which well-established institutional players
(states, for federalism; Congress and the President, for separation of
powers) or well-heeled interests with abundant allies (economic rights) can
fend for themselves without needing an independent judiciary. But Fleming
never explains how various items on his list of liberties needed to secure the
preconditions for deliberative autonomy are vulnerable and in need of
judicial protection. Consider two: intimate association and the right to
marry. One would think that these are liberties that affect millions of
Americans, of all economic levels, races, etc. Thus, one would think that
these are liberties that would be well protected in the political process, and
that if a healthy public debate occurs regarding the need to restrain one of
these liberties, to protect against a certain type of perceived social harm,
21.
22.
23.
24.

See
See
See
See

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999).
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 35, 50, 112, 247-52.
id. at 35, 50, 100, 123.
id. at 40, 89.

25. See id. at 35-36, 100.

26. See Fleming, supra note 1, at 30-36.
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that there would be nothing systematically untrustworthy about the political
processes that produced such results. 2 7 Note that I am not saying I disagree
with Fleming in the end; I happen to agree with him that courts have an
important role to play in securing liberties related to deliberative autonomy.
I believe that to be the case, however, in spite of what may well be
systematically trustworthy political processes; I would base a theory of
judicial review here on a more openly normative theory of what sorts of
liberties must remain immune from majoritarian infringement 28 and on a
more openly normative theory of what sorts of reasons and arguments
29
should be deemed legitimate for legislative majorities to rely upon.
Sunstein, on the other hand, seems to have a one-way concern with
fallibility and self-doubt. He starts the book as if this were a broader
concern, not institutionally specific. He sets forth two epigraphs; the first
one is from Learned Hand: "The spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not
too sure that it is right."' 30 When Sunstein repeats the quotation in the
argument, he does say that "Hand's comment has strong implications for
both elected representatives and citizens," adding that when we disagree we
ought to think "I might be wrong." 3 1 But in the text that follows, here and
elsewhere in the book, he talks only about judicial fallibility and the need
for judicial self-doubt, and not about legislative fallibility and the need for
legislative self-doubt. Most of Sunstein's arguments have no obvious
special application to federal judges--do they really possess less expertise

27. We would have to distinguish restrictions on such liberties based on bias against a
politically vulnerable minority (such as gays and lesbians) from restrictions on such liberties
more generally. The former type of restriction would raise equal protection questions in
addition to liberty questions.
28. Fleming also fails to explain why some liberties should be protected as part of
deliberative autonomy and others not. Although he attempts to give some shape and limit to
the concept, see id. at 98-111, what is missing is an answer to the classic, difficult, central
question of any theory of rights in a liberal democracy: What sort of harm should be deemed
regulable and what sort not? Fleming talks about the "significance" of various personal
decisions; for example, he says we should replace Justice John Marshall Harlan's "idea of
judgment as a rational process concerning tradition as a 'living thing' with a criterion of the
significance of an asserted 'unenumerated' fundamental right for deliberative autonomy." Id.
at 119; see also id. at 132. Although he spends some time on how certain liberties are
significant, Fleming does not address the theories of harm that legislative majorities may
offer for regulating such things as marriage, procreation, intimate association, and the like.
Many legislative arguments for regulation in these areas turn on inappropriate reference to
religious conceptions of the good or to theories of harm based in disgust or similar emotional
qualities that should be deemed off limits for regulation. But Fleming fails to develop a
theory of regulable harm to undergird his theory of deliberative autonomy, and this is
perhaps the central weakness of the book.
29. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in Law and
Religion: A Critical Anthology 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Is
Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535; Abner S. Greene,
The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L.J. 1611 (1993).
30. Sunstein, supra note 2, at vii (emphasis omitted) (quoting Learned Hand, The Spirit
of Liberty 190 (Irving Dillard ed., 1953)).
31. Id. at 35
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in ethics or political theory or a lesser ability to foresee the consequences of
their decisions than legislators? 32 The principal argument, therefore, for
highlighting judicial self-doubt, is that federal judges "lack a strong
democratic pedigree; they do not stand for reelection." 33 This is the classic
argument for weak judicial review, but it trades off an assumption that our
Constitution is based in legislative majoritarianism, which it is not. It is an
irreducible Constitution; deference to legislative majorities is no more
central than is ensuring the liberties of the sovereign citizens. 34 Those
liberties are positive as well as negative, and legislatures of course have a
significant role in protecting our liberties. But legislatures can be just as
wrong as courts, and we should allocate the risk of error equally between
the elected branches and the courts. Moreover, there are classic problems
with the democratic legitimacy of legislatures, 3 5 and federal judges are not
philosophers who alighted on our nation's soil and assumed interpretive
authority. They are placed on the bench via a transparently political process
involving the President and the Senate, 36 their jurisdiction is controlled by
federal law, 3 7 and Congress has the power to impeach them.3 8 So, although
they are not subject to case-by-case political checks and although they do
not have to stand for election or reelection, federal judges are still
politically checked in three important ways, which should be sufficient to
buttress their democratic legitimacy.
III. THE UNDEREXPLORED DIMENSION OF FIT

A. Introduction
As discussed above, both Fleming and Sunstein are perfectionists, if by
perfectionist we mean that constitutional interpretation must be done along
dimensions of fit and justification (and if we add Sunstein's caveat that
making the Constitution the best it can be includes attention to questions of
institutional capacity). For both, the dimension of fit is primarily about text
and case law; for neither is it about original meaning or understanding.
Fleming says we must attend to "constraints of our constitutional text,
39
history, and structure, or [to] those of our practice, tradition, and culture."
Borrowing expressly from Dworkin, Fleming agrees that "constitutional
32. See id.
33. Id.

34. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J.Contemp. Legal Issues 293
(1996).
35. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice,
74 Va. L. Rev. 423 (1988).

36. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
37. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 319-61 (5th ed. 2003).
38. See U.S. Const. art. I,§§ 2-3.
39. Fleming, supra note 1, at 6; see also id. at 61.
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interpretation proceeds back and forth between extant legal materials and
underlying principles toward reflective equilibrium between them." 40 We
search for the interpretation "that best fits and justifies the constitutional
document and underlying constitutional order." 4 1 Central to Fleming's
theory of deliberative autonomy is a particular aspect of the fit storySupreme Court case law. He lists various rights that the Court has
recognized and asks the reader to imagine that he is a "constitutional
archaeologist who digs up" these rights, which Fleming calls "bones and
shards of a constitutional culture. '42 As a constructivist, one must accept
"these bones as stipulated features'4 3(or fixed points) of a skeleton that [one
has] a responsibility to construct."
This last formulation-that a constitutional interpreter has a
responsibilityto attend to precedent-trades off some classic formulations
by Dworkin, who argues that constitutional interpretation includes moral
principles, but also must satisfy the dimension of fit. His conception of fit
is to some extent synchronic (see his argument against "checkerboard
solutions"), 44 but it is also diachronic. He calls his general theory of law
"law as integrity" 45 and dubs his theory of fit the "doctrine of political
responsibility. '46 He argues that judges have a duty to continue rather than
discard a practice; 47 consistency over time is important. 4 8 By analogy to
writing a chain novel, he maintains that just as writers do along the chain,
49
judges have a "responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand."
Common law precedent exerts a gravitational force, he says. 50 Any judicial
judgment about rights must take into account institutional history, contends

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 70; see also id. at 84.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 178-84, 227, 435 n.6 (1986) [hereinafter

Dworkin, Law's Empire]; Ronald Dworkin, Hart'sPostscript and the Characterof Political

Philosophy, 24 Oxford J. Legal Studies 1, 17 (2004) [hereinafter Dworkin, Hart's
Postscript]; Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in The Politics of Interpretation 249,

254 (W. J. T. Mitchell ed., 1983) [hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation]. The point here is
that at any given slice in time, law must be internally consistent. Dworkin's focus is on
consistency in principle of the various acts of the government; another aspect of synchronic
integrity is that the law must not simultaneously require both "x" and "not x."
45. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 44, at 225; see also id. at 165-66, 176, 411.
46. See id. at 132, 165, 180, 249, 405; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81, 8688 (1977).
47. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 44, at 87 (noting that it would serve
political integrity and justice to read the U.S. Constitution as promoting economic equality,
but a judge would violate constitutional integrity with such an interpretation); see also id. at
134, 239, 404.
48. See id. at 132, 165, 225, 404-05.
49. See Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 44, at 263; see also Dworkin, Law's
Empire, supra note 44, at 229-31.
50. See Dworkin, supra note 46, at 111, 113; see also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra
note 44, at 276-312.
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Dworkin; 51 rights are no more exogenous to a legal system than are moral
principles. Whether we are talking about a game (Dworkin uses chess as an
example 52) or law, an interpreter must protect the character of the
enterprise, Dworkin argues; 53 he expresses it at one point as "what it is fair
'54
to suppose that the players have done in consenting to the . . . rule.
Generally speaking, as a matter of political
theory, past political decisions
55
must justify current force, he argues.
Sunstein opens his book with a second epigraph, this time from Thomas
Jefferson: "The dead have no rights. '56 One would think, perhaps, that this
was the beginning of an attack on all conceptions of diachronic fit--original
meaning, original understanding, and precedent. But no, it's meant for the
former two, not the last one. Throughout the book, Sunstein effectively
critiques various forms of (what he calls) fundamentalism, which trade off
various forms of original meaning and understanding. Yet Sunstein has
only good things to say about fit conceived as following precedent
(although that too, one must note, often involves ceding power to "the
dead"). Here is the key passage:
Minimalists celebrate the system of precedent ....

Judges may not

agree with how previous judges have ruled, but they can agree to respect
those rulings-partly because respect for precedent promotes stability,
and partly because such respect makes it unnecessary for judges to 57
fight
over the most fundamental questions whenever a new problem arises.
I will turn next to summarizing the arguments for fit in constitutional
interpretation, and then to critiquing them (while leaving room for fit).
First, though, note that for Fleming and Sunstein, as for most scholars who
deem fit important in constitutional interpretation, interpreters must defer to
precedent, not merely take it into account. This is enormously important. It
is similar to the distinction in administrative law between Chevron
deference 58 and so-called Skidmore deference. 59 Under Chevron, courts
must defer to reasonable agency constructions of statutes so long as such
constructions do not contravene clear congressional intent, even if the
courts would have reached different conclusions de novo. That is real
deference (although there are vast complexities regarding how it works). It
51. See Dworkin, supra note 46, at 86-88; see also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note
44, at 401.
52. See Dworkin, supra note 46, at 101-05.
53. See id. at 102-03; see also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 44, at 52.
54. See Dworkin, supra note 46, at 104-05.
55. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 44, at 93-96, 192, 404-06; Dworkin, Hart's
Postscript,supra note 44, at 24-25.
56. Sunstein, supra note 2, at vii.
57. Id. at 28. On the stability point, see id. at 88, 108; on avoiding fights over
fundamentals, see id. at 27-28, 89; on both points, see also Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict 40-41 (1996).
58. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
59. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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turns on a content-independent reason, i.e., a reason independent of the
direct, all-things-considered calculus in which one would otherwise engage.
Under Chevron, courts defer because of an institutional reason (the greater
policy-making capacity of agencies) that instructs the courts not to examine
content or substance de novo. Under Skidmore, courts look at agency
constructions, listen to what the agency has to say, but then determine the
meaning of a statutory term de novo. This is not real deference (and thus
my "so-called" in front of "Skidmore deference" above). We should call it
"Skidmore listening" rather than "Skidmore deference." Throughout their
books, Fleming and Sunstein argue for deference to Supreme Court
constitutional precedent. Both allow for mistakes (and I will have more to
say about this below), but for neither is Court precedent simply a factor that
future interpreters should examine. Court precedent gets prima facie weight
by virtue of its existence. Thus, Fleming refers to "constraints" of fit
points, not merely to their existence as worth examining. 60
Any
constitutional theory must "acceptably fit and justify" the "fixed points" of
the Constitution's text, history, and structure. 6 1 Interpreters have a
"responsibility" to construct the Constitution from the "bones," "stipulated
features," "fixed points" of the constitutional order, which are, for Fleming,
Court precedent. 62 Sunstein's language is somewhat different-he refers to
judges "respecting" precedent rather than precedent serving as a
"constraint"-but it is clear from throughout the book (particularly in his
critiques of the radical changes fundamentalists would bring to
constitutional law) that his minimalist approach to constitutional judging
requires judges to defer to precedent, even when they deem it wrong. 63 He
puts it most clearly when he writes that "when a decision has become an
established part of American life, judges should have a strong presumption
64
in its favor."
B. Arguments for Fit
We can break down the arguments for fit (understood as prima facie
deference to Court constitutional law precedent) along five lines: (i)
Stability. 65 As we have seen, this is central to Sunstein's minimalism and
60. See Fleming, supra note 1, at 6, 61.
61. Id. at 84. It is clear that by history Fleming means precedent, not original meaning
or understanding.
62. Id. at 93.
63. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 28, 88, 108-09, 205-06, 220-21, 225, 232.
64. Id. at 108.
65. See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 38, 89, 109 (Thomas
H.D. Mahoney ed., H. Regnery Co. 1955) (1790); Sunstein, supra note 57, at 41, 76, 96;
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional

Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 584, 588 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law
and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1173, 1181 (2006); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 749-52 (1988);

Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of Our Notion of Precedent, in Precedent in Law 9, 14
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often invoked by nominees for Court vacancies when explaining to the
Senate why they would give weight to Court precedent. 6 6 Departure from
precedent is destabilizing; it disrupts established, and to varying degrees,
accepted, understandings of the Constitution; it also disrupts the
understanding of constitutional interpretation as independent of the makeup
of the current Court. (ii) Avoid fights over fundamentals. As we have seen,
this is also central to Sunstein's minimalism. 67

It is similar to David

Strauss's argument for establishing common ground for constitutional
interpretation. 68 Both Sunstein and Strauss, in turn, owe a debt to John
Rawls's account of political liberalism and the need in a diverse society
such as the United States to locate, in the political arena, an overlapping
consensus of reasonable comprehensive views. 69 Reliance on precedent
can do similar work in the judicial arena. (iii) Integrity and the rule of law.
This seems central for Fleming, and is developed by Dworkin, as set out
above. 70 Legal interpretation, on this account, requires weaving together
materials that have been developed over time, including precedent.
Connected to this notion of integrity is a rule of law conception-it is unfair
to bind people to law that has not been set forth in a reasonably clear
fashion, either by legal text or precedent. (iv) Equality. This also stems
from Dworkin's account. 7 1 The idea is that reliance on precedent ensures
equal treatment of disparate persons over time. (v) Burkean. Neither
Fleming nor Sunstein relies much on Burkean notions, 72 but they are worth
mentioning here. The basic idea is that understandings developed over
time, through precedent (for example), deserve deference for epistemic
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (discussing Jeremy Bentham's argument); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent,39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 601-02 (1987).
66. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 317-25 (2006) (colloquy with Sen. Aren Specter);
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 141-49 (2005) (colloquy with Sen. Arlen Specter).
67. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 8, 40.
68. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 Yale L.J. 1717 (2003).
69. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 133-72 (1993).
70. See also Sunstein, supra note 57, at 200 n.18; Farber, supra note 65, at 1179;
Monaghan, supra note 65, at 724, 749, 772.
71. See also Sunstein, supra note 57, at 76; Farber, supra note 65, at 1179.
72. But for some nods in this direction, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105
Sunstein describes Burkean "minimalists" as respecting
Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006).
traditional practices and distrusting those who would use their own moral/political reasoning
to revise such practices. Id. at 353. Sunstein prefers what he calls "rational minimalism,"
which has much in common with the second aspect of Burkean minimalism-distrust of
judicial ability to reason through to right answers-but little in common with the first aspect
of Burkean minimalism-the epistemic idea that traditional practices reflect wisdom
Rational minimalists will critique tradition when necessary,
accreted over time.
understanding that it may reflect "power, confusion, accident, and injustice, rather than
wisdom and sense." Id. at 380; see also id. at 353, 377, 397.
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reasons. 73 That people over time (including judges, as interpreters) have
developed an understanding of what law means is evidential of what the
law does mean, or should mean.
C. Responses to the Arguments for Fit
(i) Stability. The argument for precedent based on the need for stability,
similarly to the argument against civil disobedience based on concerns
about anarchy, is speculative. Departure from precedent is departure from a
kind of rule, and any departure from rules raises the specter of instability.
But what sort of instability would occur with departure from precedent?
How would it occur? What would the costs be? We should put aside the
risk of contagion argument, i.e., the concern that if the Court departs from
its own precedent, somehow courts and other government officials around
the country will stop paying attention to Court precedent.
Other
governmental actors might consider themselves more strictly bound by
Court precedent than the Court itself does, and if they do not, it might be for
74
reasons other than the Court's loose attitude about its own precedent.
Furthermore, risk of contagion arguments are always highly speculative;
that one actor views a rule or law as nonbinding or loosely binding will not

73. See Burke, supra note 65, at 37-39, 57, 66, 99, 108, 162, 182, 196-98, 201. Much of
Burke's argument lauds what he deems the virtues of slowly developed practices and
institutions against the vices of revolutionary change. But Burke's reverence for practice
over innovation must be seen in light of the substance of the practice he was confirming-an
expressly class-based set of social and political institutions that he viewed as "natural." For
example, he writes, "In all societies, consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some
description must be uppermost." Id. at 55. If you let the lower classes rule, "you think you
are combating prejudice, but you are at war with nature." Id. at 56. Burke does not offer a
metric by which to judge whether the consequences of practice are good ones; rather, he
praises the stratified society he sees before him, defending the status quo through his
epistemic theory that "circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom," id. at 197, while
deriding a "spirit of innovation" as "generally the result of a selfish temper and confined
views," id. at 37-38. Burke's argument at times seems a more principled defense of
deference to practice over current reasoning. He states, for example, "We are afraid to put
men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this
stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of
the general bank and capital of nations and of ages." Id. at 99. However, when combined
with his critique of leveling, of social and political equality, Burke's theory of practice over
innovation seems less purely procedural and more tethered to the specific class-based power
structure of his time.
74. There is a good case for all government officials giving no prima facie deference to
Court precedent, regardless of how strong the Court itself views its precedent, see Abner S.
Greene, Against Interpretive Obligation (to the Supreme Court), 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1661
(2006), but I will not otherwise pursue this argument here. But see Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conservative Approaches to Stare Decisis in
Abortion Cases, 10 Const. Comment. 67, 82 (1993) (arguing that a too cavalier Supreme
Court approach to its own precedent would encourage states to "ignore existing rules of law
in order to pass legislation to test the resiliency of any decision with which the dissent
disagrees").
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necessarily, or even likely, cause other actors to take a similar view. 7 5
What other instability are we concerned with? There might be some public
perception that constitutional law is not mechanical, that it turns
substantially on the political theories held by a current majority of the
Court, 7 6 but that hardly seems destabilizing; 77 it might, in fact, encourage
the people and other government officials to begin developing their own
political theories, relevant to the constitutional law issues of the day, to
challenge the Court.
Such dialogue could be healthy, rather than
79
anarchic. 78 There is also a tendency to make reliance arguments here.
For example, Sunstein writes that certain fundamentalist readings would
"wreak havoc with established law"; they would "eliminate constitutional
protections where the nation has come to rely on them." 80 We should,
though, keep "reliance" as a term for investments that cannot be undone, or
cannot be undone without substantial cost. Thus, if a court issues a
common law ruling permitting a certain type of contract, and millions of
dollars are spent in reliance on that ruling, and then the court says, "oops,
we goofed, those contracts are invalid," it would make sense to say that
reliance values cut strongly against departure from precedent (at least with
retroactive application). 8 1
But if the Supreme Court overrules a
constitutional precedent, about a right-say a speech right or a substantive
due process right-although it makes sense to say that such a ruling might
75. See Richard E. Flathman, Political Obligation 268-74 (1972).
76. See Gerhardt, supra note 74, at 82; Earl Maltz, The Nature ofPrecedent, 66 N.C. L.
Rev. 367, 371-72 (1988); Monaghan, supra note 65, at 752-53, 762-63; Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Stare Decisis and Judicial Precedent, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 281, 286, 288 (1990);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional
Doctrine, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 67, 70 (1988); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992) (expressing concern that overruling Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), might threaten the Court's legitimacy, making its decisions seem
unprincipled, a capitulation to public pressure).
77. See Andrei Marmor, Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 Legal Theory 27, 32
(2005).
78. See William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 754 (1949)
(rejecting a strong theory of precedent based on the argument that "the outward appearance
of stability is what is important"; concluding instead that "the more blunt, open, and direct
course is truer to democratic traditions ...[and] confidence based on understanding is more
enduring than confidence based on awe").
79. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 76; Fallon, supra note 65, at 588; Jill E. Fisch, The
Implicationsof Transition Theoryfor Stare Decisis, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 93, 112-17
(2003); Gerhardt, supra note 74, at 78. Frank Easterbrook argues that the Court should be
more willing to overrule recent constitutional precedent, for stability reasons. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422, 431
(1988). But see Greene, supra note 74, at 1668-70 (arguing the opposite, based on a
generation theory of participation in constitutional interpretation).
80. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 81; see also id. at 108 ("[Wlhen a decision has become an
established part of American life, judges should have a strong presumption in its favor.").
81. For a discussion of theorists who believe we overstate the reliance costs from legal
change, see Fisch, supra note 79, at 107-10. See also Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent
with OriginalMeaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 266 (2005);
David Lyons, FormalJustice andJudicialPrecedent, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 495, 511 (1985).
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change the balance of power between government and citizens, permitting
more (or less) government regulation, a much weaker sense of "reliance" is
in play here when we say that government and the people must now alter
their behavior. Here "reliance" is more a psychological point-one has
come to expect a certain regime of powers and rights-but it is not clear
why such reliance should carry much weight
if the current Court is
82
persuaded that the prior holding was a mistake.
(ii) Avoiding fights over fundamentals. In prior writing, I have explained
why Rawls's overlapping consensus argument improperly favors centripetal
over centrifugal forces. 83 My primary concern with the common ground
argument for diachronic constitutional interpretation is similar. Asking
judges to defer to precedent to avoid a fight over fundamentals is asking
them to accept precedent as common ground, even if various judges, other
government officials, and citizens, must accept such common ground from
disparate comprehensive viewpoints. As a normative matter, insisting that
citizens who hold often widely divergent views of the good and of political
justice find common ground, in interpretation as well as in acceptance of
obligations of citizenship, improperly privileges those comprehensive views
that can more easily (or at all) accept the outcomes of such common
ground. Many comprehensive views will rest easily in the overlapping
consensus, or in precedent; they will find ways from their own perspectives
to join with other divergent comprehensive views to accept principles of the
good or of political justice, or, relevant here, of interpretive points of
agreement.
But some comprehensive views will not permit such
agreements; they cannot tolerate, from their own perspectives, the outcome
of the overlapping consensus, or of precedent. Rawls's next move is to
invoke a doctrine of "reasonableness" to, essentially, ostracize persons who
hold comprehensive views that cannot join the overlapping consensus, i.e.,
to deem their views unreasonable. 84 Similarly, in the setting of interpretive
obligation, Strauss says that the common ground argument relies "on
arguments that should appeal to all reasonable members of the political
community. '8 5 To refuse to accept the common ground argument, says
Strauss, is to be impermissibly sectarian. 86 It is precisely this move,

82. Sunstein does say, once, that "stability is only one value, and for good societies it is
not the most important one." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 76. He follows this, however, not by
trumpeting the virtues of justification in constitutional interpretation, but rather by deferring
to legislative majorities. He next says, "If an approach to the Constitution would lead to a
little less stability but a lot more democracy, there is good reason to adopt it." Id. It is clear
from the book as a whole that by "democracy," Sunstein means legislative majorities.
83. See Abner S.Greene, ConstitutionalReductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses,
72 Fordham L. Rev. 2089 (2004) [hereinafter Greene, ConstitutionalReductionism]; Abner
S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's
Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 646 (1994) (book review).
84. See Greene, ConstitutionalReductionism, supra note 83, at 2092-94, 2096-98.

85. Strauss, supra note 68, at 1726.
86. See id. at 1739.
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however, that is so troubling, that renders Rawls (and, it seems, Strauss and
Sunstein, the latter by his reliance on the "avoiding fights over
fundamentals" argument) comprehensive rather than political liberals, with
all of the problems that entails for legitimation in a deeply heterogeneous
society. As with political obligation, common ground theory in the setting
of interpretive obligation asks citizens who hold divergent comprehensive
views to look backwards-to precedent, or perhaps (although not directly
relevant here), to framers' text and understanding-to find in those past
sources common reference points for resolving contemporary interpretive
dilemmas. But it, too, cannot countenance comprehensive views that reject
the overlapping consensus, that reject the common ground (which includes
precedent)-i.e., that Rawls might deem "unreasonable." Yet, legitimation
theory requires full recognition of divergent views of the good and of
political justice, and common ground theory cannot grant such full
87
recognition.
The common ground argument is meant to be a tool for reaching
settlement, for avoiding interpretive chaos, and thus is connected to the
stability argument. 88 But the second-order virtues of settlement cannot, as a
wholesale matter, trump individual autonomy (regarding obedience to law);
similarly, they cannot, as a wholesale matter, trump individual interpretive
autonomy. The key points of the argument against settlement are: that
settlement often obscures the responsibility of the actor who must make the
current decision (whether to obey law, or how to interpret law); that
settlement thus risks inverting the authority structure, fetishizing an external
source as an authority; and that settlement cannot achieve the normalcy it
claims, because of hard cases that will arise, which in the political
obligation setting reveal a law's purpose as unavailing when counterposed
against present circumstance, and which, in the interpretive obligation
setting, reveal the congeries of interpretive choices the current reader must
make. 89 I will return to these points again below, when discussing the
inevitable dominance of justification over fit.

87. For a related critique of "symbolizing national unity" as a justification for
constitutionalism, see Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93
Nw. U. L. Rev. 145, 169-75 (1998).

88. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 8, 40, 77; Fallon, supra note 65, at 584, 588; Farber,
supra note 65, at 1177-78; Postema, supra note 65, at 26-32 (discussing Hume's view);
Schauer, supra note 65, at 599; see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs
and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 93, 94, 102-03 (1989) (focusing on the

efficiency of precedent in allowing judges to specialize and rely on the work of other
judges).
89. See Maltz, supra note 76, at 370. Moreover, the settlement argument works better

when drawing a line is more important than getting the answer right, but this won't do for
"the more important cases," where we don't deem the choice at all arbitrary. See Theodore
M. Benditt, The Rules of Precedent, in Precedent in Law, supra note 65, at 89, 92 (noting,

though, that perhaps there is reason to follow precedent, even if seemingly arbitrary
resolution, in areas of sharp social disagreement).
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(iii) and (iv) Integrity and the rule of law, and Equality. I have several
concerns about the Dworkinian integrity/equality based conception of fit,
on which Fleming seems to rely. First, Although Dworkin invokes the
analogy of a chain novel, in which each subsequent author seeks to continue
the plot and maintain the characters, so that what results is a novel and not
just a pastiche of chapters, with constitutional interpretation we are dealing
with a document, and an interpretive practice, seeking nation-specific
principles of political justice that will properly empower and constrain
governmental officials in decision making that has direct effect on the lives
of the principals-the citizens. Why should we think that constitutional
interpretation must flow, must fit from case to case? A novel should make
sense as an aesthetic whole; constitutional interpretations are only about a
developing plot if one has a particular aesthetic view about constitutions,
specifically, about our Constitution. But does our Constitution really have
any less integrity if, in a particular area of law (say, the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers), the case law looks somewhat erratic, rather than
developing in a wholly linear path? If the "plot" of the Commerce Clause
is discontinuous, should that be a cause for concern, or, depending upon the
reason for the discontinuity, perhaps explicable, and justifiable, by a variety
of circumstances? Whether or not we apply a theory of mistake to the
specific area of constitutional doctrine in question-for a theory of mistake
is meant precisely to deal with disruptions in an otherwise continuous
line-my contention is that it is not important that constitutional law fit
together as a novel does. What is important is that we get principles of
political justice right, at least as right as we can given whatever we deem
appropriate endogenous constraints of our constitutional order, which need
not be constraints of diachronic fit. It is wrong to import concerns with
aesthetic integrity, from the novel or other art forms, into principles of
constitutional governance.
Similarly to Dworkin, Anthony Kronman seeks to develop a theory of
continuity in law by borrowing from outside law, 90 and once again the
conception of diachronic integrity is distorted in the translation. Claiming
to be advancing a Burkean conception, Kronman argues that human beings
are "cultural creatures as well as biological ones." 9 1 "Two features of the
world of culture are particularly striking. The first is the cumulative, or
potentially cumulative, character of its achievements ....The second is its
93
destructibility. '92 We must keep up culture or else it will deteriorate.
Still discussing the world of culture, Kronman says that we are "bound,
within limits, to respect [the past] for its own sake, just as we are obligated

90.
91.
92.
93.

See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029 (1990).
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1051-52.
Id. at 1053.
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to respect our parents for a reason that is anterior to all considerations of
utility or rights." 94 The past includes precedent in law. 95
I will leave to the margin my concerns about whether this is really a
Burkean argument and whether it makes sense to say we should honor the
past "for its own sake" 96 as opposed to for deontological or consequentialist
reasons. 97 The main problems with Kronman's argument as a defense for
following legal precedent are (a) that it depends on an is-ought move that is
not properly defended (if it could be); and (b) that it depends on a symmetry
between the cultural world and the world of law that seems hard to defend
(and that Kronman does not do much to defend). (a) Kronman makes a
point about what it means to be human. He says the attitude that we are
custodians of the past "is itself constitutive of our membership in the
uniquely
human world of culture"; 98 his argument is about "status," not
"will." 99 From these descriptive points about human beings living in
time-having a sense of the past and the future as well as the present and
creating culture that itself extends over time-Kronman argues that we have
an obligation to keep up the chain and continuity of culture. 100 But what if
we prefer to live for the present? What if pressing concerns of economic
well-being (for example) cause us (say) to destroy landmark buildings to
build housing for low-income persons? You can think of your own favorite
example. Kronman might be right that unless we pay attention to keeping
up culture, over time it will deteriorate. That is a far cry, however, from
demonstrating that we have an obligation to do so.
(b) Kronman never adequately defends the proposition that our
(purported) obligation to sustain culture over time extends to an obligation
to follow precedent in law. The argument appears to be that law is a
product of human culture over time, and thus that to fail to give respect to
precedent is tantamount to failing to respect a key aspect of our humanness,
our living in and over time. But unlike other aspects of culture, which (I

94. Id. at 1066.
95. See id. at 1032-34 (setting out a defense of precedent in law as the principal point of
the piece).
96. Id. at 1036.
97. First, although Kronman builds on Burke's observation of how human beings are
different from flies (!), see id. at 1048-5 1, Burke's arguments for honoring the past are based
on the (purported) wisdom that we can find from practice. Kronman's case for following
precedent is not epistemic in the way that Burke's is. Second, it is hard to see how
Kronman's argument is about honoring the past "for its own sake." The core of the
argument is that if we do not keep up culture it will deteriorate, and that culture is worth
keeping up. These are consequentialist arguments. To be sure, Kronman suggests we have
no choice but to keep up culture. If that is true, it is hard to see how we have an obligation to
do so (can one be obligated to do something one can't help but do?); even here, we would
not be honoring the past "for its own sake," but because of some kind of species imperative
(as distinguished from a moral one).
98. Id. at 1066.
99. Id. at 1067.
100. See id.
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will grant now for argument's sake) need diachronic tending and
development, law is a practical aspect of culture, meant to serve specific
ends of justice. The past might have something to teach us about law's
dominion, but law's past (as embodied in, inter alia, precedent) has no
worth apart from the ways it enables law's ends today, ends that sound in
rights and consequences. The point is similar to the one I made above
about Dworkin's chain novel analogy: There might be aesthetic reasons for
novels to make sense over a set of chapters; and there might be reasons
based in a proper theory of what it means to be human and what role culture
plays in our humanness that require cultural outputs to be nurtured over
time; but sustaining legal continuity over time has no such aesthetic or
cultural value.
Second, Dworkin argues that past political decisions must justify current
force. Fleming relies on a similar conception when he argues that
constitutional interpreters have a "responsibility" to construct readings of
the Constitution from "stipulated features," "fixed points," i.e., Court
precedent.' 0 ' This is certainly true in an important, but limited, way. When
government seeks to impose criminal or civil sanctions on the people, rule
of law concerns require that such sanctions follow reasonably clear rulesset down by statute or regulation-so that the people can know how to
order their conduct and so that officials are somewhat circumscribed in their
enforcement discretion. Common law is more complex, but here, too, it is
more justifiable to hold a party liable in, for example, tort damages for
violation of an established principle than it is to make up a new principle
and apply it retroactively. 10 2 To this extent, Dworkin is clearly correct that
past political decisions must justify current force. But constitutional law is
mostly about determining the powers and limits of officials, not with
determining primary conduct rules. Most important constitutional law
cases can be decided in a surprising fashion, changing understandings from
the past, without risking the jailing or fining of citizens without proper
notice. Furthermore, to the extent that surprising constitutional law
decisions might lead to sanctions against officials, the Court has developed
doctrines of qualified immunity to ensure that such fines are levied only if
the officials engaged in what a reasonable official would have understood
10 3
was a constitutional tort at the time of the action in question.
Third, Given these first two points, it isn't clear what work equality does
in a theory of diachronic interpretation. It's one thing to insist that current
citizens be treated equally under the law, including the case law. This is

101. Fleming, supra note 1, at 93.
102. Cf Abner S. Greene, Adjudicative Retroactivity in Administrative Law, 1991 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 261 (arguing for restricted retroactivity in administrative adjudication when agency
is making policy rather than carrying out clear congressional intent).
103. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

2938

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

accounted for by the principle of synchronic coherence. 104 But how
important is it that, say, a vague, broad constitutional provision such as
"freedom of speech" be construed the same today as it was fifty years ago?
If government was permitted to jail political dissidents for general political
agitation then, must government be permitted to do so now, even if it's
clear now that a broader principle of permissible protest is warranted? One
might say that we need a sophisticated theory of mistake, and that the point
about equality is simply that it should have some weight in constitutional
interpretation. I have no problem with treating fit just as a factor for
judicial consideration, without particular weight, as I will explain below in
"Room for Fit." 10 5 But Dworkinian scholars go further than this, deeming
equal treatment of litigants over time more weighty than just a factor.
However, unless we're talking specifically about concerns with jailing or
fining citizens for behavior they reasonably believed legal--dealt with
above in the rule of law discussion-it is not clear why equality over time
should have much weight at all, especially since the interesting cases will
all involve principles that we believe need adjustment. 10 6 We should not
make substantive constitutional principles turn on concerns with
adjudicative retroactivity; we can prospectively overrule erroneous
decisions if that is the way to get the law right without imposing substantial
107
hits to reliance interests.
(v) Burkean. The argument for deference to accreted sources of meaning
shares some territory with Sunstein's argument for minimalist judicial
review based on stability virtues. 10 8 Both arguments are to some extent
based in a sweeping agnosticism-a concern that we can't really know what
the right answers are and, therefore, that judges ought to rely on sources of
meaning beyond their own reasoning. Sometimes Sunstein asks judges to
104. See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice
in Stare Decisis, 105 Yale L.J. 2031, 2083-84 (1996) (distinguishing the integrity that a

legislature may achieve from integrity in adjudication).
105. See infra Part III.F.
106. See Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1989);

Peters, supra note 104, at 2058-62; Schauer, supra note 65, at 596-97. Additionally, the
equality argument doesn't logically support precedent as binding. If two cases are similar
and they come out differently, that means one result is mistaken, but precedent insists that
the second case follow the first. See Benditt, supra note 89, at 90; Michael S. Moore,
Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in Precedent in Law, supra note 65, at
183, 204. David Lyons puts the point this way: Treating like cases alike could be said to

implement "a logical constraint of moral consistency." Lyons, supra note 81, at 505. The
doctrine of precedent holds that "if a court has attached legal consequence to certain facts
because it regards that as appropriate for legal purposes, then that judgment deserves some
measure of respect." Id. at 508. But the constraint of moral consistency does not have this
conservative bias; "we are free to change our moral opinions honestly." Id.
107. See Greene, supra note 102, at 294-300; Maltz, supra note 76, at 368-69. But see

Fisch, supra note 79, at 98, 119 (stating the standard position, which assumes that
adjudication will not be purely prospective, in part because that could make it too easy for
courts to overrule precedent).
108. See Sunstein, supra note 72.
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rely on legislative majorities; at other times he asks judges to rely on
precedent. Precedent can certainly serve as a touchstone (although as we'll
see below, its malleability renders precedent a not very sturdy anchor), but
separately from its role as a constraint on judicial reasoning, is there good
reason to believe the epistemological claim that precedent is evidential of
right answers? Do we, as a people, through our court system, get closer to
truth (on whatever the interpretive question is) by a developing,
interlocking series of judicial decisions? Note that this Burkean argument
is somewhat different than the classic one that the common law works itself
toward best answers over time. There, the common law is developing the
primary rules, not interpreting another source such as the Constitution or a
statute. Here, the system of Court precedent is developing understandings
of constitutional provisions. That difference aside, the flaws with Burkean
arguments are similar in both settings. Both assume that accreted case law
deserves at least prima facie weight in current judicial decision making for
its truth value. But accreted case law might just as easily represent bias
piled upon bias, or understandings based on social facts that have
changed, 10 9 or a view of the world distorted by various systemic factors
(such as who was eligible to vote or who was protected by
antidiscrimination law and thus able to function as a full citizen in the
economic marketplace). That is, accreted case law might represent all sorts
of things, and whether it represents the best understanding of a specific
constitutional provision depends on multiple factors, all of which would
need examining, and such examination itself takes away the value of prima
facie deference to the case law simply by virtue of its existence. We might
learn some lessons from accreted case law, and as I will argue below, there
are good reasons to leave room for fit, but given all of the factors that might
make accreted case law a poor guide to best answers, the Burkean
arguments for giving prima facie deference to such case law must fail.
D. The Justification Overhang
Justification always dictates how we view fit points. 110 Fleming and
Sunstein acknowledge that precedent might be mistaken, and that it would
109. See Douglas, supra note 78, at 736 (stating the concern with an interpreter letting
"men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for
him").
110. Michael Moore offers a "natural law theory of precedent as a special case of more
general realism about science and morals." Moore, supra note 106, at 188. His focus on the
irreducibly normative nature of how precedent develops is close to mine. But as do
Dworkin, Fleming, and Sunstein, Moore deems fit points to be necessary anchors. For
example, he writes that under his theory, "one sees the common law as being nothing else
but what is morally correct, all things considered-with the hooker that among those things
considered are some very important bits of institutional history which may divert the
common law considerably from what would be morally ideal." Id. at 210. As I argue
throughout the text, the relevance of fit points is clear, but I take the Dworkinian point to be
that fit points have authority, which is the position that I reject.
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be appropriate in some circumstances for the current Court to overrule its
precedent. The alternative to a theory of mistake would be to accept
constitutional evil of the precedential variety, i.e., to accept that because
case law has developed in a certain direction, we must maintain it as is, and
perhaps maintain the directional vector. Very few are willing to say that
constitutional evil of this sort must exist; therefore, one must have a theory
of mistake. Fleming frequently states that constitutional interpretation may
"criticize some [of our practices and precedents] for failing to live up to our
Il
constitutional commitments to principles such as liberty and equality.""'
In several instances, moreover, he refuses to accept precedent. Much of the
book draws on writing that he did before Lawrence v. Texas 112 overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick,1 1 3 and thus reflects a critical approach to Bowers as
then-extant precedent; indeed, several times Fleming explains almost by
way of apology that he is still discussing certain pre-Lawrence critiques of
Bowers even though Bowers has been overruled."14
He critiques
Washington v. Glucksberg115 and (at least part of) Buckley v. Valeo 1 6 as
wrongly decided. 117 Fleming develops the principles necessary for these
critiques primarily from his broader (and impressive) justificatory apparatus
of our two moral powers and our basic liberties. It is helpful for him that
some case law supports his justificatory approach, but when case law exists
that does not, the case law is critiqued, not assimilated. One final example
of his (at least implicit) aspirationalist perfectionism is his treatment of the
religion clauses."18 Rather than giving any weight whatsoever to (a) the
fact that the First Amendment's text singles out religion for distinctive
treatment 1 19 120
(the framers having rejected the use of the word
"conscience")
and to (b) the fact that a good portion of Religion Clause
case law treats religion as distinctive, 12 1 he argues that we must
111. Fleming, supra note 1, at 98; see also id. at 6, 118, 232 n.26.
112. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
113. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
114. For various discussions of Bowers, see Fleming, supra note 1, at 51-53, 56-59, 90,
94-96, 113-15, 130, 146-49, 165, 221, 225; for the "apologies," see id. at 51, 146, 165.
115. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
116. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
117. See Fleming, supra note 1,at 73, 181, 221-24.
118. I say implicit because, as explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 8-13,
Fleming is explicitly committed to the more standard fit plus justification version of
perfectionism.
119. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....).
120. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990).
121. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (striking down, based on the Establishment Clause,
governmental use of religious symbols where governmental use of secular symbols would be
unobjectionable); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (expressly granting
an exemption to the Amish from compulsory school laws, and stating that nonreligious
claims would fail).
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"generalize[] liberty of conscience from a narrow principle applicable only
to religious persons." 122 This argument is unabashedly of the aspirationalist
perfectionist variety; justification, not fit, is doing the work.
Although Sunstein is willing to accept more precedent than is Fleming,
he, too, is critical of some Court case law. For example, he approves 124
of
Lawrence's overruling Bowers, 123 and he approves of Brown's
overruling Plessy. 125 Sunstein is critical of the Court's approach 12to7
commercial advertising, 12 6 and of United States v. Morrison.
Furthermore, in his essay in this Symposium, in laying out the four different
worlds in which constitutional interpretation might occur, he offers a list of
constitutional ends toward which any set of government institutions ought
aspire, such as no racial segregation, no ban on political speech, legitimate
claims of religious minorities, and a working system of federalism and
separation of powers. 128
Is Sunstein drawing this list of valued
constitutional ends from fit, from extant case law, or from an underlying
theory of how a good liberal democracy works? The latter appears to be the
answer. Indeed, in other, closely related work, he explicitly endorses the
need for override, for a way of determining mistakes in the current terrain
129
of case law.
Critique of precedent requires a theory of mistake, and a theory of
mistake turns on justification, which in turn relies on principles of political
theory for a liberal democracy such as ours. Neither Fleming nor Sunstein
offers purely internal, coherentist critiques of precedent. Their critiques,
and their stated constitutional goods, stem from broader commitments of
principle. A theory of mistake in constitutional interpretation is similar to a
theory of override in Fred Schauer's presumptive positivism. 130 Schauer
allows rules to be overridden, and, as I have argued elsewhere, the
justificatory apparatus needed to explain and apply the override case by
case greatly weakens the argument for the content-independent reasons for
action that rules provide. 13 1 Mike Klarman makes a similar, and helpful,
122. Fleming, supra note 1, at 104; see also id. at 65.
123. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 96-99.
124. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
125. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see Sunstein, supra note 2, at 248.
126. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 229-30.
127. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see Sunstein, supra note 2, at 238-39.
128. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2867 (describing a society "in which democratic
processes work exceedingly fairly and well, so that judicial intervention is almost never
required from the standpoint of anything that really matters").
129. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 54, 95; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 353, 377, 380,
397.
130. See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of RuleBased Decision-Making in Law and in Life 203-05 (1991); see also Schauer, supra note 65,
at 592-93.
131. See Abner S. Greene, The Work of Knowledge, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479, 149294 (1997) [hereinafter Greene, Work of Knowledge]; see also Abner S. Greene, The Missing
Step of Textualism, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1913 (2006) [hereinafter Greene, Missing Step].
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point, when he argues that translation theory-applying a constitutional
principle from one era to another time by accounting for changed
circumstances-requires the interpreter to select a level of generality at
which to do the translation, and that selection, normative as it must be, will
dictate the outcome. 132 The underlying point of this discussion is that how
one sees, accepts, discards, assimilates, and understands various points in
our constitutional culture-specifically text and precedent-depends always
on one's justificatory approach.
Furthermore, diachronic theories of constitutionalism obscure the
responsibility of the interpreter, who is living and breathing and reading and
writing and interpreting now, not in the past. 133 Interpretation is necessarily
132. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 394-412 (1997)
(critiquing translation theory). In part, Klarman critiques an article of mine, which is
unabashedly committed to the fit dimension. See id. at 399-401 (critiquing, inter alia, Abner
S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
123 (1994)); see also Abner S. Greene, Is There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v.
Gore?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1643 (2005) (another piece of the "fit" variety).
133. Gary Lawson and Mike Paulsen make this point in a dramatic way when they argue
that the text and structure of the Constitution require constitutional precedent to be
nonbinding. See Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCaseAgainst Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
ConstitutionalInterpretation: Some Modest Proposalsfrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59
Alb. L. Rev. 671 (1995); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting
Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289 (2005) [hereinafter, Paulsen, Corrupting
Influence of Precedent]. The argument tracks Paulsen's more general argument for
pluralism among constitutional interpreters: All federal officials (legislative, executive,
judicial) must swear to uphold the Constitution; the three branches of government are
coordinate, none dominant; therefore no one branch has hegemony over constitutional
meaning. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994); see also Douglas, supra note 78, at 736.
Similarly, Lawson and Paulsen argue that no constitutional interpreter (including the Court
itself) is today bound by what the Court (or any other constitutional interpreter) said, in the
past, the Constitution means. I share their views about interpretive pluralism, and their
general argument against precedential bindingness in constitutional law. But my critique of
precedent differs from theirs in at least three ways: (i) They deem the argument started and
finished with their points about the oath and coordinacy; I believe other arguments for
precedent-such as arguments from stability, common ground, integrity, equality, and the
epistemic value of practice-to be not merely prudential, but of constitutional import
themselves, and therefore I believe that such arguments must be confronted directly. That is,
I believe constitutional theory to be more than the text and structure to which Lawson and
Paulsen point; it includes, as well, various consequentialist and deontological arguments
about the working and the ends of our constitutional order. (ii) Lawson and Paulsen hold the
view that there are objectively right answers to questions of constitutional law, which any
constitutional interpreter has the capacity to ascertain. See also Peter Wesley-Smith,
Theories ofAdjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in Precedent in Law, supra note 65,
at 73, 79-80 (describing Blackstone's declaratory theory, according to which precedent is not
binding, because each judge is seeking to discover the true law, and another judge's view of
the true law might be wrong). In this fashion, they get around the argument that
constitutional meaning is often murky and that precedent can provide important anchors and
commonly accepted solutions. I prefer the view that constitutional meaning is murky (at
least regarding the capacity of actual constitutional interpreters, taking no position on
whether there are in fact objectively correct answers to all questions of constitutional
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a normative task, and it involves the acquisition of knowledge. There is no
mechanical interpretation, because texts and precedent are codes of
meaning and because human beings are not gods. Even the apparently
simplest interpretation-a so-called "easy case"-relies on prior knowledge
held by the interpreter that submerges the contested beneath the
uncontested, that foregrounds the known and backgrounds the unknown.
However, the failure to foreground at all times the work we have done to
acquire understandings of texts and precedent to make those texts and
precedent appear easy is a failure worthy of the appellation "mystification"
or "fetishism" or "bad faith." This is not to say that interpreters must
reinvent the wheel. As I will discuss below in "Room for Fit,"1 34 there are
good reasons to pay attention to past sources of constitutional meaning,
even to establish some rules of thumb. But these rules should always
remain unmasked as rules (of thumb), 135 always open to revision and
overriding at any moment, always transparent to the substantive good they
serve so they can be exposed as disserving those or other values as the case
may be.
The foregoing suggests a concern with Schauer's defense of the
proposition that precedent can constrain. The problem is that the current
interpreter's assessment of which precedents are relevant to the current
case, and how they are relevant, may involve so much reasoning
unconstrained by precedent as to render precedent not much of a tether at
all. 136 Schauer says, "The problem is to determine what constrains a
decisionmaker's control over the categories of assimilation."' 37 After some
interpretation). Thus, I must confront (and have in the text) arguments that precedent can
serve as an anchoring device and as a way to find common ground among divergent
interpretations. (iii) A debate has broken out regarding the relative virtues of originalism
versus precedent. Compare, e.g., Paulsen, Corrupting Influence of Precedent, supra, and
Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,and Burke,
57 Ala. L. Rev. 635 (2006) (both favoring originalism), with, e.g. Thomas W. Merrill,
Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of JudicialRestraint, 22 Const. Comment. 271
(2005) (favoring precedent). In my view, both positions are unjustifiably optimistic about
the ability of the past to constrain current interpretive judgments.
134. See infra Part III.F.
135. See Schauer, supra note 130, at 4-5 (discussing the difference between rules of
thumb and mandatory rules).
136. See Schauer, supra note 65, at 576-87. Schauer's argument I discuss here is about
precedent that lacks "an articulated characterization." Id. at 581. Precedent that has such a
characterization-i.e., where the holding is stated in rule-like fashion-perhaps can
constrain more, see Lyons, supra note 81, at 500-01, although as Schauer recognizes, the
articulated characterization may be just an "obscuring smokescreen," Schauer, supra note
65, at 581. In other words, whether rules can constrain, including rules stated in the holdings
of judicial decisions, raises similar questions of determining relevant analogies, levels of
generality, etc., as with precedents that lack articulated characterizations. For example, if the
holding is "Where ABC occur, therefore D," we may always ask, "Even if E also occurs?
Even if F does not also occur? Etc." How we describe the predicates will often be
incomplete, and future cases may raise questions about such incompleteness. How we
determine the answers will involve normative considerations beyond the rule-like holdings.
137. Schauer, supra note 65, at 582.
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nods toward legal realism, Schauer concludes that "naturalist/formalist
perspectives may nevertheless better describe the immediate actions of
individual decisionmakers within a given social subculture."' 138
"[D]ecisionmaking within the legal structure is constrained by the
comparative fixity of those larger societal and linguistic categories ....
Precedent rests on similarity, and some determinations of similarity are
incontestable within particular cultures or subcultures."' 139 First of all, look
at all the work Schauer has to do to make an apparently simple point-that
there are some easy cases! Second, what appears incontestable at any
moment is the product of backgrounded normative/purposive
considerations; those considerations are always in play because the
interpreter is always able to consider whether the norms and purposes
behind the categorizations fit in the case at bar. The work
of determining
0
relevance overwhelms any purported anchoring gains.14
This discussion is another version of the Hart-Dworkin debate about
whether there is open texture in the law or whether all questions regarding
what the law is at any slice in time have right answers. 141 My argument
that precedent can't constrain judicial decision making in any significant
way is an acknowledgment of law's open texture. The Dworkinian rightanswer approach leads to problems such as that pointed out by Kenneth
Kress. 142 Dworkin critiques H. L. A. Hart's approach as, inter alia,
producing impermissibly retroactive adjudication through judicial
discretion to fill the gaps in law's open texture. Dworkin's right-answer
approach purports to solve this problem, because judges are always stating
what the law is, and not what it should be. But Kress argues that settled law
might change between the time of the events being litigated and the time of
the adjudication, and this produces, says Kress, a "ripple effect."' 143 The
138. Id. at 584.
139. Id. at 585-87. See also David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22

Const. Comment. 299, 300 (2005).
140. See Greene, Missing Step, supra note 131; Greene, Work of Knowledge, supra note

131. My argument here echoes that of Michael Moore, who contends that determinations of
similarity are inextricably normative. Common law reasoning (Moore's focus in discussing
precedent) is non-hermeneutic; it does not involve interpreting canonical texts. Rather, we
reason as we do in science, in an inductive, coherentist manner. See Moore, supra note 106,
at 184-88, 197, 200. Moore critiques conventionalism. A conventionalist "wishes to pretend
that he can stand outside his own belief system for just a peek at how the universe isnamely, to see that there is no way that it is. In this we should see an illicit attempt to return
to foundationalist epistemology." Id.at 207. Instead, Moore offers a "general metaphysical
realism,.., a natural law theory of precedent as a special case of more general realism about
science and morals." Id. at 188. In the common law, says Moore, "what is to be justified is
why a particular case. . . is to be universalized into a rule to govern future cases," and that
turns on substantive considerations. Id. at 200.
141. See Dworkin, supra note 46, at 31-37, 61, 69-71, 280, 332; H. L. A. Hart, The
Concept of Law 124-36 (2d ed. 1994).
142. See Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights
Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369 (1984).

143. Id. at 371.
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ripple effect argument "requires only that legal truths sometimes change
when settled law is enlarged by new decisions and that sometimes such
changes occur in legal propositions that are dispositive of cases where the
events occurred prior to the change and the adjudication occurs after the
change."' 144 To maintain the right answer thesis, and overcome the
retroactivity problem, Dworkin necessarily has to say (and does say) that
Kress is right only when judges make mistakes rather than continue to spin
the seamless web of the law. 145 A Hartian open texture approach, on the
other hand, allows us to see many judicial decisions as relatively
unconstrained by precedent, and instead as marking out new territory for
law's coverage.
There is a potential retroactivity issue here, of course, but perhaps we
should see it not as true retroactivity-where new law is applied to
antecedent conduct-but rather as the kind of retroactivity that accompanies
the specification of murky legal parameters. Perhaps we have learned to
live with this level of legal uncertainty; after all, both parties must insure
against guessing incorrectly how open texture will be closed. Purely
prospective adjudication can also play a role here, especially in cases
involving penalties and truly surprising interpretations.
I believe this approach is consistent with David Lyons's argument that
even in hard cases, where we look beyond standard legal rules, the
decisions are being made according to law. 146 Lyons writes,
What the law requires and allows is a function not just of legal rules, but
also of considerations without which decisions cannot soundly be made.
These considerations are relevant to a judicial decision, so that a court
must take them into account and weigh them in the balance
in a judicially
1 47
appropriate way. Their neglect would be a judicial error.

This makes enormous sense: We're always deciding legal cases based on a
variety of types of reasoning that go beyond mechanical application of legal
rules. What facts are relevant? What levels of generality to use? What
supplemental moral principles to use, and with what weight? It makes no
sense to say that all this is extralegal; it's part of the standard legal process.
Open texture, thus, describes the quality of legal interpretation not being
fully specified by extant sources such as text, original understanding, and
precedent; but open texture is consistent with viewing the further
specification of legal answers, drawing on material from outside the law, as
legal, rather than as extralegal. Part of interpreting law, in short, involves
144. Id. at 380 n.63.
145. See Ronald Dworkin, Response, in Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of
Ronald Dworkin 291, 295 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006); see also S. L. Hurley, Coherence,
Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, in Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of

Ronald Dworkin, supra, at 69, 95.
146. See David Lyons, Justification andJudicialResponsibility, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 178, 188
(1984).
147. Id. at 188-89.
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going beyond law; we incorporate extralegal standards by reference, as it
were. The supplemental principles are not untethered; rather, they are part
of a larger universe of principles of political morality that we use-all the
time-in doing legal interpretation.
A final thought on this subject: Dworkin insists on right answers to legal
interpretive questions, but he also rejects the thesis that legal materials are
148
limited to pedigreed sources, and says that principles are part of law.
This might be the same as Lyons's point about law's incorporating
principles of political morality. It's not important that I go further here on
this. The key points to the discussion are that precedent's power to
constrain adjudication is weak; that many normative supplements need be
added to determine how to use precedent; and that we need not see such
supplements as extralegal.
E. Do We Really Need Two Gaps?
Especially given the necessary dominance of justification over fit, it is
unclear why Fleming and Sunstein insist on a gap between the Constitution
and political justice. Both are alert to the gap between the Constitution and
the judicially enforced Constitution; both, in separate ways, explain why
and how courts should leave some constitutional matters for development in
the political process. 149 But it is less clear why each believes (as each
does) 150 that we do not have a "perfect" Constitution or, more to the point,
that we should not construe it as reaching political justice. There appears to
be a different kind of overhang here-perhaps better deemed a hangoverfrom legal positivism. We are all so used to assuming the separation thesis,
i.e., that law and morality need not overlap, that we apply a version of that
thesis to the relationship between the Constitution and political justice. But
as I have argued elsewhere, 15 1 we can be legal positivists without being
constitutional positivists; that is, we can accept a conceptual gap between
law and morality but refuse to accept a conceptual gap between our
Constitution and political justice.
Our Constitution is an explicitly
aspirational document. It begins,
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do152ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.

148. See Dworkin, supra note 46, at 22.

149. See supra Part II; see also Fleming, supra note 1, at 214-15; Sunstein, supra note 2,
at 127.

150. See Fleming, supra note 1, at 16, 211; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2867-70.
151. See Abner S. Greene, Can We Be Legal Positivists Without Being Constitutional
Positivists?, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1401 (2005).

152. U.S. Const., pmbl.
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The Constitution assigns and limits governmental power to assure all of
these things, including liberty (which we may understand as both positive
and negative). Once we have explained that the political branches as well
as the courts have a role to play in interpreting and implementing the
Constitution, it is not utopian to insist that our Constitution be understood
as pointing toward a perfect union-"more perfect" than what came before.
F. Room for Fit
First, basic rule of law virtues must be honored. Insofar as criminal and
civil sanctions are involved for primary citizen conduct, interpretations that
are wholly surprising or that otherwise depart from clearly established legal
principles on which reliance is rightly based should either not be issued as
interpretations or should be issued but with prospective remedies only. In
this way, basic principles of legality will exert some anchoring force on
interpretation.
Second, diachronic fit points may help us learn about the content of
political justice, in the shadow of which all questions of legal interpretation
must be asked. Whether one believes the constitution of the given political
society is perfectionist and should be interpreted always along the vector of
political justice or whether one believes the constitution states a limited
domain of justice, the texts and precedents and practices of the people may
help us gain a better understanding of the content of political justice. 153
This point is related to a third point: As Stanley Fish has often maintained,
there is no such thing as constraint-free interpretation, regardless of how
one conceptualizes fit points.154 Interpreters are human beings interpreting
in light of everything they know, which includes fit points such as text and
precedent. Attention to such fit points is unavoidable, as a psychological
matter.
Fourth, just as both political and interpretive authorities should operate
with a healthy sense of self-doubt, so should interpreters who seek to
challenge authority make self-doubt self-conscious and limiting on their
interpretations. Just because diachronic fit points don't have to be followed
does not mean they shouldn't be, in many cases. Interpretive challengers
are no better positioned to assume the correctness of their views than are the
sources and authorities they challenge; to avoid interpretive hubris,
attention to the views of others, including past views ensconced in
diachronic fit points, must be paid.
This point is related to a fifth point: One of the main arguments in favor
of a strong conception of both political and interpretive obligation is that

153. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. This analysis is the same for statutes, at a
different level.
154. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationin the Law and
in LiteraryCriticism, in The Politics of Interpretation, supra note 44, at 271.
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otherwise we are left with chaos borne of self-interest. 155 Law and its
interpretation through both diachronic fit points and a supreme court are
needed to achieve a kind of communal finality, operating against the selfinterest of plural authorities that would exist if obligation were not taken
seriously. There is much to this, and checks against ambition and interest
are central to the U.S. constitutional story.156 But we must attend to the
problems of self-interest on all sides-on the side of lawmakers, fit points
over time, and canonical law interpreters, and on the side of those
disobeying law and refusing to follow diachronic fit points and a supreme
court. We must develop a rubric for assessing the strength of the claims of
(purported) legal authority and the claims of those opposing such authority
from positions of moral and interpretive dissent.
Sixth, throughout this piece, I have been rejecting the argument that
current interpreters should give prima facie deference to diachronic fit
points. I have not been rejecting the relevance of those points. 157 One
might think this is a thin distinction, but it is critical to my arguments
regarding interpretive (and, elsewhere, political) obligation. Theorists
supporting such obligations rarely insist that they are absolute; their
principal concern is to develop the argument for prima facie deference,
which can be overridden. My principal concern is the opposite-with
attempting to show that the case for even merely prima facie deference to
these various purported authorities is a weak one.
IV. TOWARD A DIFFERENT THEORY

158

We should understand our Constitution as aspiring toward political
justice. Executives and legislatures, as well as courts, must play a role in
fleshing out constitutional meaning, and in pointing toward justice. All
interpreters must operate with a healthy sense of self-doubt, and must be
155. See Burke, supra note 65, at 37, 68, 106-08, 290; Sunstein, supra note 57, at 76;
Sunstein, supra note 72, at 395-96.; Farber, supra note 65, at 1178 n.23; Postema, supra note
65, at 12 (discussing Hobbes).
156. See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (1969); The
Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
157. For example, Gerald Postema describes Hale's traditionary conception of how
precedent has authority, in the following ways: Precedent has authority not by being decided
or settled, but by "having a place within a recognized body of common experience"; it is a
product of reflective judgment, itself authoritative because of "its historical links to a shared
sense of identity in the community." Postema, supra note 65, at 22. Precedent has authority
in providing examples of practical judicial reasoning and "the entire body of such cases
provides the authoritative context of experience within which such practical reasoning takes
place and against which the practical significance of the instant case is interpreted." Id. at 23.
My argument throughout has been that the arguments for precedent having authority-i.e.,
that we should defer to it in a content-independent way, giving it peremptory force-are not
successful. We should see precedent as relevant, but not authoritative.
158. 1 am developing some of the ideas in this section in a book project entitled "Against
Obligation: A Theory of Permeable Sovereignty."
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open to the views of other interpreters. Thus, although I would grant the
Supreme Court a greater role in fleshing out constitutional meaning than
would Sunstein, I do so only with the caveat that the Court must understand
constitutional interpretation as dialogical, and stand down from its
occasional hubris about being the only institution that can say what the
Constitution means. 159 Furthermore, although I would grant the Court a
significant role in constitutional interpretation, I have argued here for a
weak view of precedent, and thus constitutional questions remain open for
reinvestigation by all branches of government.
Despite this plural
understanding of constitutional interpretation, laced with a heavy dose of
self-doubt all around, our constitutional processes will still yield laws,
generally valid, that infringe on the deeply held beliefs of some small
numbers of our fellow citizens. There are ultimately no valid arguments for
even the prima facie political obligation of any of us. Thus, despite their
best efforts to achieve political justice, our governmental agents should
establish a system of judicial exemptions and legislative accommodations to
ease the burden of laws that infringe on conscience, of both the religious
and nonreligious sort. 1 60 These exit options will provide a measure of
legitimacy to a government that, even in a liberal democracy such as ours,
is ultimately making claims for plenary sovereignty that must yield to a
different conception, one of permeable sovereignty.
This yielding
represents the most profound instantiation of governmental self-doubtthere are other sources of norms that people hold dear, and they must be
respected.

159. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958).
160. This argument for exemptions and accommodations for both religious and
nonreligious conscience is not inconsistent with my critique above of Fleming's treatment of
the Religion Clauses as improperly arguing for a general right of conscience under our
Constitution. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. There, I was contending that
Fleming's treatment of Religion Clause text and jurisprudence could not be explained by fit;
justification was doing the main work. Here, I rely, too, on a justificatory argument. For a
different justificatory argument, focusing on the distinctiveness of religion, see sources cited
in supra note 29.
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